Riyadh Agreement On Yemen

While these measures to implement the Riyadh Agreement represent remarkable progress, it is not yet known whether they will help overcome long-term divisions between the two sides or prevent both sides from undermining the agreement. A more transparent discussion on the militarization of the South and the responsibility for its protection, as well as a rigorous dialogue process that would lead to local ambitions and political party agendas, is needed for the Riyadh agreement to make a real and lasting difference and prevent the country`s fragmentation. The agreement was signed following the start of Saudi-led negotiations on 11 August 2019 following the STC`s initiative to drive hadi loyalists out of Aden and other southern regions. This section describes the main points covered by the agreement.1 Opponents of STC often reduce the group to a mere deputy from the United Arab Emirates, who continue to fund and support some of their political operations, but this does not mention the public support that the STC has in its communities. The Hadi government and loyalists continue to ignore protests in the southern region in support of the STC and overplay those who support Hadi. Much of this propaganda undermines the prospects of a genuine implementation of an agreement. Moreover, the update of the STC does not bode well for Yemen, as it deepens political marginalization. In addition, the Hadi government cannot request the demilitarization of STC-allied forces because it is unable to protect the South from Houthi military incursions. Clashes persist with Houthi forces in Dhala and the Houthis have conducted drone strikes against targets in the South. Moreover, the lack of political representation and economic abuse, despite an abundance of resources in the South, is one of the STC`s biggest problems. The lack of understanding of the marginalization that affected the South after unification with the North in 1990 and the exploitation and repression that followed after the 1994 civil war widened the gap between communities and constituted a major mobilization for the cause of the South. Even within the STC, opinions differ as to the value of the agreement, and a prominent figure, Ahmed Okeil,1, argues that there is no confidence in an agreement whose benefactors have no influence on its implementation or not.

This is an indication of other reactions from the South to the agreement, peppered with accusations that the “Muslim Brotherhood group of Qatar” in the Hadi government has not delayed its implementation. A member of a committee observation the implementation of the Riyadh agreement confirmed to Anadolu Agency that the STC forces began to withdraw from Aden and moved towards the frontlines in the Ad Dali` province. These provisions resolve the first point of the agreement. These include a national unity government of 24 ministers divided equally between North and South and formed within 30 days of signing; Hadi will nominate the Prime Minister and appoint its members to representatives who are not involved in fighting or propaganda during the events of August 2019. The Prime Minister-designate will then appoint, in agreement, a governor and director of security for the governorate of Aden within 15 days, for Abyan and Dhalea within 30 days and for the other southern provinces within 60. Mouwadea added: “The agreement reduces President Hadi`s powers, as any appointment decisions he makes would require Saudi Arabia`s approval.” The agreement and its full or partial implementation are expected to face challenges of various kinds: Saeed hailed the political forces that “keenly” engaged in the consultations, saying that the implementation of the agreement would unite Yemenis in their battle against the Houthis.